Using debt to your advantage starts with one idea: debt is a tool, and the same loan can build a business or sink it. Elon Musk bought Twitter in 2022 using about $13 billion of bank debt alongside $33.5 billion of equity, which let him control a $46.5 billion purchase with far less of his own cash. That is the headline. The filings also show what the borrowing cost and how long it took to unwind. This guide uses that deal, three other documented examples and the South African rules that apply to you to show how borrowing works, what lenders look at and what to check before you sign.
This guide was last reviewed on 11 November 2026 and is general information, not financial or legal advice. Every figure comes from a primary document we read: SEC filings, JSE announcements, company reports, the South African Reserve Bank and SARS. Where we could not confirm something, we say so.
The short version
- Borrowing works when the return on the money borrowed beats its cost and the business generates the cash to make every repayment.
- Musk’s Twitter purchase used about $13 billion of bank debt and $33.5 billion of equity, according to the proxy statement. The term loan priced at Term SOFR plus 6.50%, and the debt was repaid only in March 2026, with a $425 million prepayment penalty on the term loans.
- Apple borrowed $17.0 billion in 2013 while holding $111.3 billion offshore, a different reason to borrow: avoiding a tax bill on bringing cash home.
- The South African repo rate was 7.25% and the prime lending rate 10.75% on 10 November 2026, according to the SARB, so the cost of borrowing here is real and changes with each decision.
- Tongaat Hulett shows the other side: lender claims of about R7.7 billion against about R5.1 billion of assets realisable in liquidation, according to its business rescue plan.
Good debt and bad debt: what makes borrowing work
Borrowing is a tool, and the same loan can build a business or sink it. The difference comes down to three tests. If a loan passes all three, it is usually the productive kind. If it fails one, the risk rises quickly. This is general information, not personal financial advice, and your own numbers and lender terms will differ.
- Return above cost. What the borrowed money earns must be higher than what it costs, after tax and after the extra running costs it brings.
- Cash flow to carry it. A profitable project still fails if the cash arrives later than the repayments fall due.
- Something behind it. A productive asset, a signed contract or a receivable that the money turns into cash, so that the loan is matched to what it funds.
The arithmetic, with invented numbers
The figures below are an illustration with round numbers, not a real business or a real loan quote. Say a business borrows R1,000,000 at 14% a year to buy a machine that adds R300,000 a year in operating profit before interest.
- Interest in the first year is R140,000 (14% of R1,000,000).
- The money earns 30% (R300,000 on R1,000,000) and costs 14%, so the spread is worth R160,000 a year before tax. That is the test of return above cost, and it passes.
- Interest cover is operating profit divided by interest: R300,000 divided by R140,000 is about 2.1 times.
Now add the repayment schedule. If the loan is repaid over five years in equal capital instalments, the capital is R200,000 a year. Debt service in year one is R140,000 plus R200,000, or R340,000. Debt service cover, cash available divided by interest plus capital due, is R300,000 divided by R340,000, or about 0.88. Below 1.0 means the machine does not pay for itself fast enough, even though the return beats the interest rate. The business must find R40,000 from elsewhere, or negotiate a longer term. This is why lenders look at both ratios.
The bad version is simple. Use the same loan to buy stock that sells slowly and adds only R80,000 a year. The business now earns 8% on money that costs 14%, and loses R60,000 a year before tax.
A gearing ratio gives a quick check on size. If that business had operating profit before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) of R1,200,000 and total debt of R3,000,000, debt to EBITDA would be 2.5 times. The higher the multiple, the longer it would take earnings to clear the debt, and the less room there is for a bad year.
Case study: how Elon Musk financed the Twitter purchase
Every figure below comes from a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), read in full. Amounts are in US dollars. We give no rand conversions, because we did not tie the figures to a dated exchange-rate source. This is an account of how the financing worked, not investment advice.
The deal
On 13 April 2022 Musk offered $54.20 per share in cash for all of Twitter. His Schedule 13D amendment of 21 April shows he already held 73,115,038 shares, or 9.1%. Twitter’s board agreed a merger on 25 April. Twitter’s proxy statement says the price was a premium of about 38% to the closing price on the day before his stake became public.
The same document says the total funds needed, including fees and expenses and repaying some Twitter debt, were about $46.5 billion. Musk tried to terminate the agreement on 8 July 2022 (13D amendment). On 3 October his advisers told Twitter he would proceed, and the closing Form 8-K confirms the merger completed on 27 October 2022, with each share converted to $54.20 in cash.
The financing stack
The proxy statement lists three pillars, which together equal the $46.5 billion:
- Equity: $33.5 billion committed. Musk first committed $21 billion. He raised that to $27.25 billion on 4 May and to $33.5 billion on 24 May 2022.
- Bank debt: $13 billion committed by Morgan Stanley Senior Funding and other institutions: a $6.5 billion senior secured term loan, a $500 million revolving facility, and two bridge facilities of up to $3 billion each (one secured, one unsecured).
- Margin loan: $12.5 billion at first, then dropped. A margin loan is borrowing against shares. This one was to be secured on Tesla shares, with a maximum loan-to-value of 20% (13D, 21 April). Musk let half the commitment lapse on 4 May and the rest on 24 May, replacing each half with more equity (13D, 24 May). The margin loan never funded.
The equity was not all Musk’s cash. On 4 May he lined up co-investors with about $7.139 billion of commitments, including $1 billion from the Lawrence J. Ellison Revocable Trust, $800 million from Sequoia Capital and $500 million from Binance, and one holder who could contribute 34,948,975 Twitter shares valued at $54.20 (13D, 5 May). His own 73.1 million Twitter shares were also worth about $3.96 billion at the deal price (our arithmetic).
Tesla Form 4s show what he sold. We summed the sales reported on Form 4s: about 9.6 million shares for $8.5 billion on 26 to 28 April 2022, and about 7.9 million shares for $6.9 billion on 5 to 9 August 2022. The Form 4s do not state the purpose of the sales. Later sales (about $3.9 billion on 4 to 8 November, $3.6 billion on 12 to 14 December) came after closing. Tesla split its shares in August 2022, so share counts before and after are not comparable.
Why debt meant less of his own cash
Roughly $13 billion of the $46.5 billion was bank debt, so about 28% of the price was borrowed and secured on Twitter’s own assets, not Musk’s. That is the point of borrowing: the lenders’ money bought the same control. Control was not diluted either, because lenders hold no ownership. The trade-off is that the borrowed money must be repaid with interest whatever the business earns.
What it cost
SpaceX’s 2026 IPO prospectus (a filing, because SpaceX now owns the former Twitter through xAI) gives the terms as signed (SpaceX Form 424B4, June 2026):
| Facility (October 2022) | Size | Pricing |
|---|---|---|
| First lien term loan (B-1) | $6,705 million | Term SOFR plus 6.50% |
| First lien bridge | $3,000 million | Term SOFR plus 6.75%, rising 0.50% each quarter, capped at 9.50% |
| Second lien bridge | $3,000 million | Term SOFR plus 10.00%, rising 0.50% each quarter, capped at 13.00% |
| Revolver | $500 million | Term SOFR plus 4.50% |
The term loan was secured on substantially all of the company’s assets and carried mandatory quarterly repayments of 0.25% of the original amount. A prospectus note says the effective rate on the B-1 loan was 12.40% at 31 December 2025. The filings do not give one clean “interest cost of the Twitter deal” figure, and we did not calculate one.
Twitter’s own existing debt was also affected. In November 2022 the company bought back about $675 million of its 3.875% 2027 notes and $998 million of its 5% 2030 notes after the change of control, and ended its prior revolving credit agreement (8-K).
What happened to the debt
The prospectus shows the $6 billion of bridge loans, meant to be replaced by bonds, were still outstanding at 31 December 2024 ($5,966 million), alongside $6,571 million of the term loan. In February 2025 X refinanced into a $4,741 million fixed-rate term loan at 9.50% and repaid the first lien bridge in full; the second lien bridge was fully repaid by April 2025, and the new loan grew to $5,966 million. Another $51 million arrangement fee falls due in February 2027.
The ownership chain changed as well. xAI acquired X Holdings on 28 March 2025 by share exchange, and SpaceX acquired xAI on 2 February 2026. That acquisition caused a “technical default” under SpaceX’s own credit facility, because of the debt taken on. SpaceX obtained a waiver on 2 March 2026 and took a $20 billion unsecured bridge loan that repaid the X term loans and xAI debt, together $18,905 million including $1,163 million of prepayment penalties. Of that, $425 million was the penalty on the former Twitter term loans.
We could not read any outlet’s report on banks struggling to sell the 2022 debt at a discount, because Reuters is not reachable by our research tools. The filings above only show that the bridge loans stayed on the books for more than two years. We also did not confirm the position after the SpaceX third-quarter 2026 report, which we could not retrieve.
What this does and does not teach
- It teaches: debt let a buyer control a large asset with about a quarter of the price borrowed, secured on the target itself. Plan the cheapest funding first: Musk dropped the Tesla-share margin loan within weeks, and replaced it with equity.
- It teaches: lenders price risk. Floating rates of Term SOFR plus 6.50% to 10.00%, step-ups and caps meant the cost was heavy, and refinancing cost fees and penalties of hundreds of millions.
- It does not teach: that borrowing was the smart part. The filings do not show whether the purchase was profitable, and we do not judge that. SpaceX also records an impairment of the Twitter brand in 2023.
- It does not transfer directly: a South African business owner will not have a billionaire’s other assets behind a deal, and personal guarantees are common on local loans. For tools that fit smaller firms, see our guide to invoice and asset finance and our funding roundup.
Four more examples, from the documents
Three of the four below are borrowing that worked as planned for a time, and one is a cautionary case. Every figure comes from a filing or announcement we read directly. Scale the lessons, not the amounts, to your own business. The Twitter deal, covered above, shows the same principle.
1. Apple, 2013: borrowing instead of bringing cash home
Apple had no debt at the end of its 2012 financial year, but it did have a lot of cash held overseas. According to its annual report for the year to 28 September 2013, US$111.3 billion of its cash and marketable securities was held by foreign subsidiaries, and amounts held there are generally subject to US income tax on repatriation. The same report says the cash for dividends and share buybacks would come from domestic cash, US operating cash flow and borrowings. In that year Apple raised US$17.0 billion in long-term debt, of which US$3.0 billion was floating-rate, and used interest rate swaps to fix the cost of the floating portion.
The prospectus supplement for the notes lists six tranches, from 0.45% notes due 2016 to 3.85% notes due 2043. It states net proceeds of about US$16.9 billion, for general corporate purposes including share repurchases and dividends under its expanded capital return programme. Why borrowing helped: Apple could fund shareholder returns from new debt at coupons between 0.45% and 3.85% on the fixed notes, rather than bring home overseas cash that would be taxed. What it cost: interest expense of US$136 million in the first part-year, against net income of US$37.0 billion, plus a repayment calendar, US$2.5 billion due in 2016 and US$14.5 billion from 2018 to 2043. The point for a smaller business is that Apple had huge earnings behind the debt. The loan was a choice, not a rescue.
2. Dell, 2013: a take-private built on debt
When Michael Dell and Silver Lake took Dell private, the definitive proxy statement filed on 31 May 2013 set out how the buyers would pay. It estimated total funds needed at about US$28 billion, including refinancing some of Dell’s existing debt and paying fees. The sources were up to US$1.4 billion of cash equity from the Silver Lake investors, up to US$500 million of cash equity from Mr Dell plus his shares, up to US$250 million from another investor, up to US$2 billion of 7.25% unsecured subordinated notes sold to Microsoft, up to about US$13.75 billion from debt financings, and at least about US$7.4 billion of cash already in the company.
Why the borrowing helped: the buyers were acquiring equity worth about US$20.7 billion (the aggregate merger consideration in the filing, at US$13.65 a share) while committing a little over US$2 billion of new cash equity. Debt, the Microsoft notes and Dell’s own cash supplied most of the rest. What it risked: the proxy states that the remaining equity holders would bear the risks of ongoing operations and the risks of taking on additional debt. The debt sits ahead of the equity, so the interest and repayments have to be met from the company’s own cash before the owners see a return.
3. Woolworths and David Jones, 2014: debt plus a rights offer
On 9 April 2014 Woolworths Holdings announced an offer of R21.4 billion (A$2.1 billion) in cash, A$4.00 a share, for Australia’s David Jones, a 25.4% premium to the prior close. It planned to fund the offer from existing cash, new debt facilities and an underwritten rights offer, with an equity bridge facility at completion to be repaid from the rights offer. The funding was underwritten by Citi, J.P. Morgan and Standard Bank. The company said it had identified synergies of at least R1.4 billion (A$130 million) a year in earnings before interest and tax within five years.
Why the borrowing helped: it allowed a large purchase without waiting to save the money, and the rights offer shared the cost with shareholders. What it cost: in a voluntary announcement on 19 December 2022, Woolworths said it was selling its entire shareholding in David Jones to Anchorage Capital Partners. It said the sale would remove about R17 billion in liabilities relating to the store portfolio, and its chief executive was quoted as saying the strategic rationale at the time of the acquisition had not materialised to the extent originally envisaged. Debt is repaid whether or not the synergies arrive.
4. The cautionary case: Tongaat Hulett
Tongaat Hulett’s business rescue plan of 29 November 2023 records that business rescue began on 27 October 2022 and that the company’s revenue in the 2023 financial year was about R7.8 billion. The same plan puts the lender group’s claims at about R7.7 billion. It states that the company’s assets were encumbered and secured in favour of that lender group, lists book value of assets at R5,897 million, and says the gross realisable value in a liquidation, as estimated by BDO, was about R5.1 billion. Put plainly, the claims were larger than the assets that stood behind them.
The plan proposed that a buyer, RGS Bidco, acquire the lenders’ claims for R3.6 billion in cash and convert them into equity, leaving it with 95% of the shares. A company announcement of 3 June 2025 confirms that the plan was adopted, as announced on 12 January 2024. The plan also records that the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) lifted its post-commencement finance to R2.3 billion in the course of the rescue, an example of how rescue funding itself becomes a new layer of debt. We have not tied this outcome to any single cause, and the plan lists several.
How lenders judge you
- Interest cover: operating profit divided by interest. Lenders want a clear margin, because a dip in profit should not wipe out the ability to pay interest.
- Debt service cover: cash available divided by interest plus capital repayments. As the illustration above showed, this is the stricter test and the one that catches a loan whose term is too short.
- Debt to EBITDA: how many years of earnings it would take to clear the debt.
- Covenants: promises in the loan agreement, such as keeping a ratio above or below a level, or not borrowing elsewhere without consent. Breaking one can let the lender demand repayment, so read them before signing.
- Security: assets the lender can claim if you default, from equipment and property to receivables. The Tongaat plan shows what a full security package looks like in a rescue.
- Personal suretyship: an owner agrees to pay if the company cannot. Treat it as a real commitment.
The rates, right now
On the Reserve Bank’s current market rates page, the SARB policy rate (the repo rate) stood at 7.25% and the prime lending rate at 10.75% on 10 November 2026. If your loan is priced off prime, a change at the next decision moves your repayments. Our week-ahead calendar covers the 19 November rate decision.
What the National Credit Act says about company borrowers
Section 4(1) of the National Credit Act, as published in the Government Gazette of 15 March 2006, says the Act applies to every credit agreement between parties dealing at arm’s length, except, among others, an agreement where the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover, together with that of related juristic persons, equals or exceeds the threshold the Minister sets under section 7(1). It also excludes a “large agreement”, as described in section 9(4), where the juristic person is below that threshold. Section 7(1) caps the turnover threshold at R1,000,000. The Department of Trade and Industry’s Notice 713 of 2006 set it at R1,000,000, and the higher threshold used for large agreements at R250,000. Section 4(2)(c) says the Act applies to a credit guarantee only to the extent that it applies to the facility the guarantee relates to. We read the 2006 text and notice; check the Regulator for any later determination.
Tax: is the interest deductible?
SARS’s Interpretation Note 142 of 12 December 2025 says that section 24J(2) of the Income Tax Act deems a borrower to have incurred the amount of interest calculated under that section, and that it is deductible from income if certain requirements are met. It adds that finance charges that are not “interest” as defined must separately meet section 11(a) read with section 23(g), which allows expenditure incurred for the purposes of trade, in the production of income and not of a capital nature. This is general information, and the detail depends on your facts and the version of the Act in force, so ask a registered tax practitioner.
Where to look for finance
We have already explained the routes. See our guides on invoice finance and asset finance, business funding that is open now, DSBD funding explained and IDC funding explained.
A checklist before you borrow
- Write down exactly what the money buys and what it should earn each year.
- Compare the expected return with the full cost: interest, fees, insurance and tax effects.
- Work out debt service cover on a bad year, not only your best one.
- Match the term to the asset’s life, and short-term needs to short-term funding.
- Check whether the rate is fixed or tied to prime, then test your repayments at a rate 2 percentage points higher.
- Read every covenant and ask what happens if you breach one.
- List what security is required and whether a personal suretyship is part of it.
- Check whether the National Credit Act applies to your agreement, and what the contract says if it does not.
- Keep a cash buffer, so one late customer does not become a missed payment.
- Ask a registered accountant or tax practitioner to review the plan before you sign.
Five mistakes, tied to the evidence
- Borrowing for a plan that depends on synergies. Woolworths identified synergies of at least R1.4 billion a year in 2014 and later said the rationale had not materialised as envisaged.
- Looking only at the interest rate. Our illustration has a good spread and a debt service cover of 0.88.
- Ignoring what sits behind the debt. At Tongaat, claims of about R7.7 billion faced realisable assets of about R5.1 billion in a liquidation.
- Floating-rate exposure left unmanaged. Apple used swaps to fix the cost of its US$3.0 billion of floating-rate notes. Test your own prime-linked loan on paper.
- Treating a personal surety as a formality. The National Credit Act does not apply to a company loan above the threshold, so the contract, not the Act, sets your protections.
Frequently asked questions
Is borrowing always cheaper than using my own cash?
No. Apple borrowed because its cash was held overseas and subject to US tax on repatriation. If your cash sits in your account, borrowing only makes sense when the return on the money clears the interest, fees and extra risk.
Does the National Credit Act protect my company?
It may not. Section 4(1) excludes juristic persons at or above the threshold and large agreements, and Notice 713 of 2006 set the thresholds at R1,000,000 and R250,000.
Is the interest I pay tax deductible?
SARS says interest calculated under section 24J(2) is deductible if certain requirements are met. Other finance charges must pass the general deduction test. Ask a tax practitioner about your own facts.
What does a lender mean by “security”?
Assets the lender can claim if you default. In the Tongaat plan, the company’s assets were encumbered and secured in favour of the lender group.
What if I cannot repay?
Speak to the lender early. In severe cases, business rescue under the Companies Act puts practitioners in charge while a plan is prepared, as at Tongaat from 27 October 2022, and it does not guarantee that shareholders keep their stake.


